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CORPORATE LAW: DISREGARDING THE CORPORATE
ENTITY
INTRODUCTION
Chief Justice Marshall defined a corporation as "an artificial being,
invisible, intangible, and existing only in contemplation of law ... pos-
sess[ing] only.those properties which the charter of its creation confers
upon it ... ." Under modem law, corporate formation is governed by the
state. Once formed, a corporation is a legal entity, distinct and separate
from those who created it.2 The most prominent feature of the corpora-
tion is that it limits the liability of both the shareholders who comprise it
and the directors, officers, and corporate personnel who operate within
its parameters.' A parent corporation's liability can also be limited with
respect to the wrongs of its subsidiary.! Limited liability in a corporation
is often referred to as "the corporate veil." The corporate veil doctrine,
however, is not unqualified.
This survey explores two specific exceptions to the corporate lim-
ited liability principle. Part I provides a background of the classic com-
mon law doctrine of piercing the corporate veil, which allows the share-
holders of a corporation to be held personally liable for the acts of the
corporation. This part analyzes the Tenth Circuit's latest interpretation of
the common law doctrine in a case in which the plaintiff attempted to
hold a parent company liable for its subsidiary's actions. Part II examines
a "statutory pierce" under the Internal Revenue Code section 6672,
looking at two cases exemplifying the recent position of the Tenth Cir-
cuit.
I. Trustees of Dartmouth College v. Woodard, 17 U.S. 518, 636 (1819).
2. BLACK'S LAW DICTIONARY 340 (6th ed. 1990).
3. HARRY G. HENN & JOHN R. ALEXANDER, LAWS OF CORPORATIONS AND OTHER
BUSINESS ENTERPRISES, 130 (3d ed. 1983); see Marilyn Blumberg Cane & Robert Bumett, Piercing
the Corporate Veil in Florida: Defining Improper Conduct, 21 NOVA L. REV. 663, 665 (1997). All
fifty states have adopted the principle of limited liability as a fundamental rule of corporate law.
Peter French, Parent Corporation Liability: an Evaluation of the Corporate Veil Piercing Doctrine
and its Application to the Toxic Tort Arena, 5 TUL. ENVTL. L.J. 605, 610 (1992). This rule has been
articulated in the Revised Model Business Corporation Act, providing that:
(a) A purchaser from a corporation of its own shares is not liable to the corporation or its
creditors with respect to the shares except to pay the consideration for which the shares
were authorized to be issued or specified in the subscription agreement.
(b) Unless otherwise provided in the articles of incorporation, a shareholder of a corpora-
tion is not personally liable for the acts or debts of the corporation except that he may be-
come personally liable by reason of his own acts or conduct.
MODEL BUS. CORP. ACT § 6.22 (1991). With respect to shareholder liability, the corporate veil
protects both natural persons and artificial entities, such as corporations or similar business associa-
tions, that hold stock in the corporation. French, supra at 610.
4. See Yoder v. Honeywell Inc., 104 F.3d 1215 (10th Cir. 1997) (determining that a con-
sumer of a subsidiary's product could not pierce corporate veil of parent company).
5. Carsten Alting, Piercing the Corporate Veil in American and German Law-Liabilities of
Individuals and Entities: A Comparative View, 2 TULSA J. COMP. & INT'L L. 187, 190 (1995).
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I. THE COMMON LAW DOCTRINE
A. Background
The doctrine of "piercing the corporate veil" provides an exception
to the principle of limited liability.' Courts will pierce the corporate veil
when a corporation is used in the furtherance of crime, to facilitate fraud,
to justify a wrong, or to defeat public convenience Additionally, courts
may pierce the veil when a corporation has not functioned independently
from the wrongdoer.' Once the corporate veil is pierced, the corporation
is no longer viewed as a legal entity Instead, the corporation is viewed
as an association of persons, exposing the personal assets of the stock-
holders, corporate directors, and personnel connected with the wrongful
activity to claims by creditors seeking compensation for the wrongs
committed by the corporation." Thus, when the corporate veil is pierced,
only the individuals who are responsible for the acts justifying the pierce
are exposed to liability while passive shareholders incur no liability." In
the absence of a pierce, the liability of corporate shareholders is gener-
ally limited to their respective investment in the capitalization of the
company."
DeWitt Truck Brokers, Inc. v. W. Ray Flemming Fruit Co.'3 repre-
sents a classic corporate veil-piercing case."' The Fourth Circuit regarded
corporate veil piercing as an equitable doctrine, placing the burden of
6. French, supra note 3, at 606.
7. Shaun M. Klein, Comment, Piercing the Veil of the Limited Liability Company, From Sure
Bet to Long Shot: Gallinger v. North Star Hospital Mutual Assurance, Ltd., 22 J. CORP.,L. 131, 136
(1996) (quoting United States v. Milwaukee Refrigerator Transit Co., 142 F. 247 (E.D. Wis. 1905));
see also Lowell Staats Mining Co., Inc. v. Pioneer Uravan, Inc., 878 F.2d 1259, 1264-65 (10th Cir.
1989) (stating that the plaintiff has the burden of proving that the corporate veil "was used to defeat
public convenience, or to justify or protect wrong, fraud or crime").
8. See American Fuel Corp. v. Utah Energy Dev. Co., Inc., 122 F.3d 130, 134(2d Cir. 1997)
(setting forth criteria for determining whether a president dominated his company, thus allowing the
corporate veil to be pierced); Birbara v. Locke, 99 F.3d 1233, 1238 (1st Cir. 1996) (stating that the
veil may be pierced when the wrongdoer either exercises pervasive control over the company to its
detriment or when the companies are so intermingled that they are ambiguous).
9. Klein, supra note 7, at 136.
10. French, supra note 3, at 606.
11. J. WILLIAM CALLISON & MAUREEN A. SULLIVAN, LIMITED LIABILITY COMPANIES: A
STATE-BY-STATE GUIDE TO LAW AND PRACTICE § 5.2, at 43 (1994) (noting that only those who
caused the piercing lose the protection provided by the corporate form).
12. HENN & ALEXANDER, supra note 3, at 130. There are, however, unlimited or double
liability corporations which exist in a limited number of jurisdictions. Id.
13. 540 F.2d 681 (4th Cir. 1976).
14. French, supra note 3, at 612. In DeWitt, the creditor brought action seeking to hold the
corporation's president personally liable. DeWitt, 540 F.2d at 683. The Fourth Circuit determined
that the shareholders were separate from the corporation in which they held shares and determined
the president was personally liable. Id. The court noted that ruling otherwise would create an exten-




loss on the most responsible party, despite a lack of intent to defraud."
Many states have adopted this doctrine, though courts have not all ap-
plied it as liberally as the Fourth Circuit in DeWitt.'6 Many modem courts
utilize a two-part inquiry to consider when determining whether to pierce
the corporate veil and subject the corporate insiders to personal liability."
First, the courts address whether the unity of interest and ownership are
strong enough to make the corporate identity indiscernible from that of
the individual. Second, the court considers whether an inequity would
result if the bad acts are treated as those of the corporation alone.'9
The Tenth Circuit has acknowledged that the corporate veil exists for
the purpose of insulating businesses from liability and therefore has been
reluctant and cautious in its application of the veil piercing doctrine." In
15. DeWitt, 540 F.2d at 683. The court enumerated eight factors to consider in determining
whether equity would be served by piercing the corporate veil. These factors include
whether the corporation was grossly undercapitalized for the purposes of the corporate
undertaking, failure to observe corporate formalities, non-payment of dividends, debtor
corporation insolvency at the time, dominant shareholder siphoning of corporate funds,
non-functioning of other officers or directors, absence of corporate records, and the fact
that the corporation is merely a facade for the operations of the dominant shareholder or
shareholders.
DeWitt, 540 F.2d at 686-87 (citations omitted); see also French, supra note 3, at 613.
16. French, supra note 3, at 614. This variation in application is not surprising, however,
because states have developed widely divergent methods and rationales for piercing the corporate
veil. Note, Piercing the Corporate Veil: The Alter Ego Doctrine Under Federal Common Law, 95
HARV. L. REv. 853, 855 (1982).
17. Sung Bae Kim, A Comparison of the Doctrines of Piercing the Corporate Veil in the
United States, 3 TULSA J. COMP. & INT'L L. 73, 75 (1995); see Oklahoma Oil and Gas Exploration
Drilling Program v. W.M.A. Corp., 877 P.2d 605, 609 (Okla. Ct. App 1994); Salt Lake City Corp. v.
James Constr., Inc., 761 P.2d 42, 46-47 (Utah Ct. App. 1988). There does exist a federal common
law doctrine pertaining to piercing the corporate veil. NLRB v. Greater Kansas City Roofing, 2 F.3d
1047, 1052 (10th Cir. 1993). This test requires two distinct inquiries:
(i) Was there such unity of interest and lack of respect given to the separate identity of
the corporation by its shareholders that the personalities and assets of the corporation and
the individual are indistinct, and (ii) would adherence to the corporate fiction sanction a
fraud, promote injustice, or lead to an evasion of legal obligations.
City Roofing, 2 F.3d at 1052. The "intemal affairs doctrine" allows federal common law to be ap-
plied when the state has little interest in the case and there are federal interests involved. Kim, supra
at 77-78.
18. Kim, supra note 17, at 75.
19. Id. Some states have not required a showing of inequity resulting from a failure to pierce
the veil, but have necessitated a demonstration of injustice which would result from such a failure.
See Jackson Hole Traders, Inc. v. Joseph, 931 P.2d 244, 251 (Wyo. 1997). Some courts have estab-
lished a third prong to this test which necessitates a showing that an injustice would result from a
failure to pierce the corporate veil. Kim, supra note 17, at 75; see Doughty v. CSX Transp., Inc., 905
P.2d 106, 111 (Kan. 1995); see also French, supra note 3, at 611 (citing Saphir v. Nuestadt, 413
A.2d 843, 853 (Conn. Super. 1979)). Many jurisdictions have, however, considered this third factor
to be superfluous, finding that it is encompassed within the second prong. Kim, supra note 17, at 75.
20. Boughton v. Cotter Corp., 65 F.3d 823, 836 (10th Cir. 1995); see also Cascade Energy and
Metals Corp. v. Banks, 896 F.2d 1557, 1576 (10th Cir. 1990); Skidmore v. Canada Life, 907 F.2d
1026 (10th Cir. 1990). State courts within the Tenth Circuit have also been "reluctant and cautious"
when piercing the corporate veil. See Sampson v. Hunt, 665 P.2d 743, 751 (Kan. 1983); Kvassay v.
Murray, 808 P.2d 896, 906 (Kan. Ct. App. 1991); Salt Lake City Corp. v. James Constr., Inc. 761
P.2d 42, 46 (Utah Ct. App. 1988); Colman v. Colman, 743 P.2d 782, 786 (Utah Ct. App. 1987).
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Yoder v. Honeywell,2' the court established that the corporate veil could
be pierced when recognition of the corporation as a separate legal entity
would be unfair.' Hence, the court found that equity would permit a
court to disregard the corporate form when the shareholders used the
corporation as a mere instrumentality to conduct their own personal af-
fairs, without regard to the corporation's independent existence, or for
the purpose of evading or defeating legislative policy, or to perpetrate
fraud.?
The veil of a parent corporation may also be pierced in a par-
ent/subsidiary relationship, holding the officers of the parent corporation
personally liable for the actions of its subsidiary." The Tenth Circuit es-
tablished that when determining whether a subsidiary acted as a mere
instrumentality of its parent, warranting a pierce requires a review of
many factors.' The court must consider the amount of subsidiary stock
owned by the parent company, the amount of the subsidiary's expenses
and salaries paid by the parent company, and the amount, if any, of
shared business and assets.' In addition, the court must determine if the
companies have common officers and directors in order to assess
whether the subsidiary's officers and directors acted independently, or
whether the subsidiary's officers took direction from the parent corpora-
tion. ' The court also considers how adequately the subsidiary has been
capitalized.' The court must also examine the parent company's desig-
nation and classification of the subsidiary in its financial statements.'
Finally, the court must investigate whether each company meets the for-
mal requirements of incorporation." By weighing each of these factors,
21. 104F.3d 1215 (10th Cir. 1997).
22. Yoder, 104 F.3d at 1220; see Micciche v. Billings, 727 P.2d 367, 372-73 (Colo. 1986);
AMFAC Mechanical Supply Co. v. Federer, 645 P.2d 73,81 (Wyo. 1982).
23. Yoder, 104 F.3d at 1220; see Micciche, 727 P.2d at 373; see also Reader v. Dertina and
Assoc. Mktg., Inc., 693 P.2d 398, 399 (Colo. Ct. App. 1984) (noting that a court may pierce "where
the corporate entity has been used to defeat public convenience, or to justify or to protect, wrong,
fraud, or crime or in other similar situations where equity requires"); Kvassay, 808 P.2d at 906
(stating a corporate entity may be disregaided if it is used to cover fraud or to work injustice, or if
necessary to achieve equity); Rogers v. Rahill, 827 P.2d 896, 897 (Okla. Ct. App. 1991) (stating that
Oklahoma law allows the piercing of the corporate veil if the corporate entity is used "(I) to defeat
public convenience, (2) justify wrong, (3) to perpetrate fraud whether actual or implied, or (4) to
defend crime."); Bergh v. Mills, 763 P.2d 214, 218 (Wyo. 1988) (stating that a showing of fraud
may be sufficient in itself to warrant a piercing of the corporate veil).
24. Fish v. East, 114 F.2d 177, 191 (10th Cir. 1940); see Scott v. AZL Resources, Inc., 753
P.2d 897, 900 (N.M. 1988) (determining that mere control by a parent corporation is insufficient to
pierce the corporate veil, and instead requiring that the plaintiff demonstrate moral culpability attrib-
utable to the parent, such as use of the subsidiary to commit fraud).




29. Id. The court must examine whether the subsidiary was referred to as a subsidiary or as a




the court can assess whether the subsidiary acted as a mere instrumental-
ity of the parent company, enabling the court to assign liability to a par-
ent for the actions of its subsidiary. The Tenth Circuit considered just
such a case during the survey period.3"
B. Yoder v. Honeywell Inc."
1. Facts
In Yoder, the plaintiff, an employee, claimed she incurred stress in-
juries from the consistent use of a defectively designed keyboard while at
her place of employment. The plaintiff sought compensation for her inju-
ries and subsequent suffering.33 Rather than suing the manufacturer of the
keyboard, Bull HN Information Systems Inc. (Bull), the plaintiff sought
to pierce the corporate veil and hold Honeywell, Inc. (Honeywell), Bull's
parent, liable."' The plaintiff contended that Bull was not a corporation
separate from Honeywell, but rather that it was a mere instrumentality of
Honeywell. The district court granted Honeywell summary judgment
and dismissed the claim, relying on the fact that the keyboards were not
made by Honeywell, but rather, by Bull, a wholly-owned subsidiary of
Honeywell. 6
2. Decision
The Tenth Circuit first made the determination that Colorado law
shall govern. 7 The court recognized that the purpose of incorporation
includes the isolation of liabilities among separate entities.38 When it
would be unfair to recognize the subsidiary as a separate entity because
of a significant improper use of the corporate structure, however, the
parent company should be held liable for its subsidiaries' wrongs. 9 In
order to demonstrate this "unfairness," the plaintiff must demonstrate
that the parent company disregarded the independence of its subsidiary
and that the subsidiary acted as a mere instrumentality for the transaction
31. The survey period extended from September 1, 1996 through August 31, 1997.
32. 104F.3d 1215, 1218 (10th Cir. 1997).
33. Yoder 104F.3d at 1218.
34. Id. at 1220. Bull HN Information Systems Inc. is a subsidiary of Honeywell that was
formerly known as Honeywell Information Systems Inc. Id. at 1218.
35. Id. at 1218.
36. Id. at 1219.
37. Id. at 1220. The court concluded that Colorado law applied even though the case origi-
nated in New York and the company was incorporated in Delaware. Id. at 1219-20. In accordance
with New York law, once it is determined that there is an actual conflict in substantive law, then the
"interest analysis" test is applied to determine jurisdiction of a case. Id. (citing Schultz v. Boy Scouts
of Am., Inc., 480 N.E.2d 679, 684 (N.Y. 1985)). The interest analysis test requires the court to first
decide which state has the greatest interest in the litigation, then apply the substantive law of that
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of the shareholders' own affairs. ' In addition, the plaintiff must show
that the subsidiary acted to perpetrate wrongful behavior or to evade im-
portant legislative policy."'
In considering all the relevant factors, the court determined that Bull
acted as an independent subsidiary, rather than as an instrumentality of
Honeywell. 2 The court found that Honeywell owned all of Bull's stock,
and the two corporations shared some of the same directors. In addition,
Honeywell provided financial support to its subsidiary and facilitated the
process to incorporate Bull."
Although these two entities were closely linked, the court found that
Bull was not grossly undercapitalized, nor did Honeywell pay salaries or
other expenses for Bull. 5 Honeywell constituted only five percent of
Bull's business.' Additionally, the court also determined that Honeywell
did not refer to Bull as a department or division in its financial state-
ments, nor did Honeywell direct Bull's executives or directors.' More-
over, Honeywell consistently observed the legal formalities in the main-
tenance of the separate identities of these two corporations." Therefore,
the Tenth Circuit recognized Honeywell and Bull as separate corporate
entities and affirmed the trial court's dismissal of the plaintiff's products
liability action. '9
C. Other Circuits
Within the survey period, other circuits set forth the rationale for
piercing the corporate veil. In National Soffit & Escutcheons Inc. v. Su-
40. Id.
41. Id.
42. Id. at 1221. This test sets forth an elementary basis for determining whether the subsidiary
is an instrumentality of the parent. These elements include whether.
(1) The parent corporation owns all or a majority of the capital stock of the subsidiary.
(2) The parent and subsidiary corporations have common directors or officers. (3) The
parent corporation finances the subsidiary. (4) The parent corporation subscribes to all
the capital stock of the subsidiary or otherwise causes its incorporation. (5) The subsidi-
ary has grossly inadequate capital. (6) The parent corporation pays the salaries or ex-
penses or losses of the subsidiary. (7) The subsidiary has substantially no business except
with the parent corporation or no assets except those conveyed to it by the parent corpo-
ration. (8) In the papers of the parent corporation, and in the statements of its officers,
"the subsidiary" is referred to as such or as a department or division. (9) The directors or
executives of the subsidiary do not act independently in the interest of the subsidiary but
take direction from the parent corporation. (10) The formal legal requirements of the sub-
sidiary as a separate and independent corporation are not observed.
Id. at 1215 (quoting Lowell Staats Mining Co. v. Pioneer Uravan, Inc., 878 F.2d 1259, 1262-63
(10th Cir. 1989)).
43. Id.
44. Id. at 1221-22.




49. Id. at 1225.
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perior Systems, Inc., the Seventh Circuit reiterated the general doctrine
of piercing the corporate veil.' The court asserted that a plaintiff must
demonstrate (1) that the corporate form was "ignored, controlled or ma-
nipulated, and that it was merely the instrumentality of another, and (2)
that the misuse of the corporate form would constitute a fraud or promote
injustice."" Further, the court established eight factors to consider when
determining whether to employ its equitable power to pierce the corpo-
rate veil, with respect to parent/subsidiary relationships.' These factors
include (1) the undercapitalization of the subsidiary; (2) the absence of
corporate records; (3) the fraudulent representation by the corporation's
shareholders or directors; (4) the use of the corporation to promote fraud,
injustice, or illegal activities; (5) the payment by the corporation of indi-
vidual obligations; (6) the commingling of assets or affairs; (7) the fail-
ure to observe required formalities; and (8) the other shareholder acts or
conduct."
The Second and Ninth Circuits both embraced a veil-piercing test
similar to that established in Escutcheons.' These courts require evidence
of complete domination over the subservient corporation, coupled with a
showing that this domination was used to perpetrate a fraud or wrong'
In Chan v. Society Expeditions, Inc., the Ninth Circuit asserted that the
corporate form could be disregarded if the corporate entity was so domi-
nated that its alter ego, the dominating individual or parent, was actually
conducting its own business, and not that of the corporation.' The court
determined that the common ownership of three corporations by the par-
ent company alone, was not enough to justify ignoring the corporate
shield. 7
In American Fuel Corp. v. Utah Energy Development Co.," the
Second Circuit considered whether a president exercised such domina-
50. 98 F.3d 262, 265 (7th Cir. 1996).
51. Escutcheons, 98 F.3d at 265.
52. Id.
53. Id.
54. Chan v. Society Expeditions, Inc., 123 F.3d 1287, 1294 (9th Cir. 1997); American Fuel
Corp., v. Utah Energy Dev. Co., Inc., 122 F.3d 130, 134 (2nd Cir. 1997); BridgestonelFirestone, Inc.
v. Recovery Credit Servs., Inc., 98 F.3d 13, 17 (2nd Cir. 1996).
55. Chan, 123 F.3d at 1294; American Fuel, 122 F.3d. at 130; Bridgestone, 98 F.3d at 17.
56. Chan, 123 F.3d at 1294.
57. Id.
58. 122 F.3d 130 (2nd Cir. 1997). The court identified a list of factors to identify a dominated
corporation:
(I) Whether corporate formalities are observed, (2) whether the capitalization is ade-
quate, (3) whether funds are put in and taken out of the corporation for personal rather
than corporate purposes, (4) whether there is overlap in ownership, officers, directors,
and personnel, (5) whether the corporate entities share common office space, address and
telephone number, (6) the amount of business discretion displayed by the allegedly
dominated corporation, (7) whether the alleged dominator deals with the dominated cor-
poration at arms length, (8) whether the corporation is treated as an independent profit
center, (9) whether others pay or guarantee debts of the dominated corporation, and (10)
1998]
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tion over his corporation that a veil pierce is warranted."9 The company
had no contracts, no office space for employees, no capital of its own,
nor did it have an individual address or bank account.' Additionally, the
president contributed his own capital to the company."' The court noted,
however, that the other corporate officer had the same amount of author-
ity over the company.62 In addition, there was no indication that the
president commingled the corporate funds with his personal funds, or
that there was any need for an independent source of funds. 3 Upon con-
sideration of these factors, the court determined that the company was an
entity separate from its president."
In Birbara v. Locke, ' the First Circuit embraced the two-part test
from the 1968 Massachusetts Supreme Court case My Bread Baking Co.
v. Cumberland Farms, Inc.' My Bread established two circumstances
which warrant a departure from the general principle of corporate sepa-
rateness. 7 The court determined that when a representative of one corpo-
ration actively and directly participates in the activities of another corpo-
ration, exercising pervasive control to the detriment of one of the compa-
nies involved, the corporation will not be regarded as a separate entity."
Or, in the alternative, when the separateness of two companies is sub-
stantially disregarded in the intermingling of activities between the two
entities, or when serious ambiguity arises regarding the manner and ca-
pacity in which the corporations and their representatives are acting, the
court will set aside the principle of separateness.' The My Bread test is
more restrictive in its means of disregarding the corporate veil than those
means offered in other jurisdictions.
D. Analysis
The Yoder court adhered to the common law veil-piercing inquiry,
emphasizing that the veil could be pierced if it would be unfair to recog-
nize the subsidiary as separate from its parent corporation.' Both the
Tenth and the Second Circuits have recognized a ten part test used to
whether the corporation in question had property that was used by the alleged dominator
as if it were the dominator's own.
American Fuel, 122 F.3d at 134.
59. Id. at 134.
60. Id. at 134-35.




65. 99F.3d 1233 (1st Cir. 1996).
66. Birbara, 99 F.3d at 1238 (citing My Bread Baking Co. v. Cumberland Farms, Inc., 233
N.E.2d 748, 751-52 (Mass. 1968)).
67. Id. (citing My Bread, 233 N.E.2d 748,752).
68. Id. (citing My Bread, 233 N.E.2d 748, 751-52).
69. Id. (citing My Bread, 233 N.E.2d 748, 751-52).
70. Yoder v. Honeywell, Inc., 104 F.3d 1215, 1220 (10th Cir. 1997).
[Vol. 75:3
CORPORATE LAW
determine whether a subsidiary is an instrumentality of its parent, which
would establish a unity of interest between the two and legitimize a
court's decision to pierce the veil." These tests differ in several ways.
Unlike the Second Circuit test," the Yoder test emphasized the parent
company's ownership of stock in its subsidiary, the designation of the
subsidiary as a department within the parent company's corporate papers,
and whether the parent company represents the majority of its subsidi-
ary's business." Unlike Yoder," the Second Circuit's test evaluated the
amount of assets and office space shared by the parent and subsidiary
companies and the extent to which the subsidiary acted as an independ-
ent profit center."
The First Circuit's adoption of the My Bread veil-piercing test de-
parted from the two-pronged veil-piercing test derived from common law
and exemplified in Yoder."6 Rather than looking at whether there was a
unity of interest among a corporation and an individual or subsidiary, as
the common law doctrine dictates, the My Bread test requires one of two
showings." There must be a showing that the corporation had either been
pervasively controlled to its detriment, or, in the alternative, that a lack
of separateness or a demonstrated intermingling of activities created an
ambiguous relationship between the company and the individual or sub-
sidiary." The Second Circuit's My Bread test does not consider whether
there would be an injustice resulting from a failure to pierce the veil."9
The Sixth Circuit was much more stringent in its requirements, necessi-
tating not only proof that the company was only an instrumentality of the
individual or subsidiary, but also that it was used wrongfully, resulting in
injustice.'
II. OFFICER LIABILITY UNDER SECTION 6672
A. Background
During the survey period, the Tenth Circuit also examined the veil-
piercing doctrine with respect to corporate officers in their capacity as
71. American Fuel Corp. v. Utah Energy Dev. Co., 122 F.3d 130, 134 (2d Cir. 1997); Yoder,
104 F.3d at 1221.
72. American, 122 F.3d at 134.
73. Yoder, 104F.3d at 1221.
74. Id.
75. American Fuel, 122 F.3d at 134.
76. Compare Birbara v. Locke, 99 F.3d 1233, 1238 (1st Cir. 1996), with Yoder, 104 F.3d at
1220.
77. Birbara, 99 F.3d at 1238 (citing My Bread Baking Co. v. Cumberland Farms, Inc., 233
N.E.2d 748,751-52 (Mass. 1968)).
78. Id. (citing My Bread, 233 N.E.2d at 752).
79. Id. (citing My Bread, 233 N.E.2d at 752).
80. RCS Engineered Prods. Co., Inc., v. Himmelspach, 102 F.3d 223,226 (6th Cir. 1996).
1998]
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employers.8' An officer can be charged with the duties of collecting,
truthfully accounting for and paying over to the government taxes with-
held from the company's employees. This officer is considered a "re-
sponsible person" for the carrying out of these duties." When a responsi-
ble person willfully fails to pay these tax withholdings to the govern-
ment, Internal Revenue Code § 6672 imposes, among other penalties,
full liability upon the individual for the unpaid tax.3 The Tenth Circuit
analyzed this requirement, determining that "willfulness" is demon-
strated when a corporate officer recklessly disregards the risk that with-
held taxes would not be paid to the government."
B. Tenth Circuit Decisions
1. Finley v. United States
a. Facts
Finley, secretary-treasurer and board member of the Halsey-Tevis,
Inc. (Halsey), informed Halsey's president that the company had with-
held social security and income taxes from its employees, but failed to
pay them for the last half of 1988.3 The president instructed Finley to
make these payments; however, the president took no other action and
did not make further inquiries into the matter, despite the fact that he had
the ability to issue checks on the company's behalf.'
In a subsequent tangle of financial problems, Halsey's bank account
was frozen." As a result, Halsey was unable to make these payments to
the government." Halsey did, however, provide the bank with $105,000
81. See Finley v. United States, 123 F.3d 1342 (10th Cir. 1997); Goldston v. United States,
104 F.3d 1198 (1 0th Cir. 1997); Denbo v. United States, 988 F.2d 1029 ( 10th Cir. 1993).
82. I.R.C. § 6672(a) (1994 & Supp. 1997); see Finley, 123 F.3d at 1348 (stating that a "re-
sponsible person" is personally liable for failure to pay witholding taxes); Goldston 104 F.3d at
1200; Denbo, 988 F.2d at 1032.
83. I.R.C. § 6672(a) (1994 & Supp. 1997). This statute provides:
Any person required to collect, truthfully account for, and pay over any tax imposed by
this title who willfully fails to collect such tax, or truthfully account for and pay over
such tax, or willfully attempts in any manner to evade or defeat any such tax or the pay-
ment thereof, shall, in addition to other penalties provided by law, be liable to a penalty
equal to the total amount of the tax evaded, or not .collected, or not accounted for and
paid over.
ld.; see Slodov v. United States, 436 U.S. 238, 248 (1978) (stating that persons responsible for
collecting income tax and failing to remit it will be subjected to personal liability).
84. Finley, 123 F.3d at 1343.
85. Id.





in collections and requested that it be applied toward the debt. 9 The bank
refused and, instead, applied it to Halsey's loan indebtedness.'
The IRS assessed a $144,876 penalty against Halsey's president
personally for not taking further action and failing to pay the taxes under
section 6672.91 The IRS argued that Halsey's president, as a corporate
officer, should be held personally liable for his company's failure to pay
withheld taxes and social security when he knew of the failure and had
sufficient authority to correct it.' The district court found in favor of the
government in a post-trial motion for judgment, finding that "a reason-
able jury could not have found that [the company president] met his bur-
den of proof."'3
b. Decision
The Tenth Circuit stated that federal statutory law holds a corporate
officer or employee personally liable for the entire amount of the with-
held taxes if he or she willfully failed to remit them to the government."
The statute holds an officer liable even if the officer did not have a mo-
tive or specific intent to defraud the government." The court asserted that
it may find that a corporate officer acted willfully when he or she pro-
ceeded with a "reckless disregard of a known or obvious risk that trust
funds may not be remitted to the government. '" Accordingly, the court
considered the president's failure to investigate or correct the misman-
agement of funds as a demonstration of willful conduct.' The court noted
that a jury could determine whether a responsible person willfully failed
to pay the government, considering the totality of the circumstances."
The court proceeded to apply an exception to the general rule that a
presumption of liability results from a finding of willful conduct." The
court stated that the exception would be applied if the court found that
the officer had reasonable cause to withhold payment to the




92. Id. at 1345.
93. Id. at 1344.
94. Id. (citing I.R.C. § 6672(a) (1994 & Supp. 1997)).
95. Id.
96. Id. at 1345 (quoting Denbo v. United States, 988 F.2d 1029, 1033 (10th Cir. 1993)).
97. Id.
98. Id. at 1348.
99. Id.
100. Id. The "reasonable cause" exception has been narrowly construed in order to "(1) further
the basic purpose of § 6672 to protect government revenue, (2) discourage corporations from self-
executing government loans using the tax monies they hold in trust, and (3) avoid making the gov-
ernment 'an unwilling partner in a floundering business."' Id. (citing Collins v. United States, 848
F.2d 740, 741-42 (6th Cir. 1988)); see Thibodeau v. United States, 828 F.2d 1499, 1506 (11 th Cir.
1987); Newsome v. United States, 431 F.2d 742, 747 (5th Cir. 1970)).
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ception, one would have to demonstrate that "(1) the taxpayer has made
reasonable efforts to protect the trust funds, but (2) those efforts have
been frustrated by circumstances outside the taxpayers control.""°' The
Tenth Circuit remanded Finley to the trial court to determine whether
Johnson met these criteria, a finding that would allow the company
president to escape liability.'"
2. Goldston v. United States'°3
a. Facts
Goldston, the sole shareholder of Sunnylane Electronic, Inc. (Sun-
nylane), collected more than $27,000 in FICA federal income taxes from
his employees, but failed to remit this money to the IRS.'" Sunnylane
reported the withholdings to the IRS.'" The IRS assessed a penalty
against Goldston under section 6672, although the assessment was later
determined to be void.'" Goldston filed for Chapter 11 bankruptcy relief
and the case was dismissed.'" As a result, the IRS filed a notice of a fed-
eral tax lien with the state register of deeds." Then Goldston filed for
Chapter 13 protection from liability in which the IRS filed a secured
claim.'" This claim of tax liability, however, was based on the prior as-
sessment."0 The district court affirmed the bankruptcy court's granting of
the government's motion for summary judgment, holding that the statute
obligates the taxpayer to pay the withheld taxes to the government."'
b. Decision
Because Goldston collected taxes and failed to remit them to the
government, the circuit court identified him as a "responsible person"
and imposed personal liability under section 6672 for the withheld
funds."2 The court determined that Goldston's failure to pay taxes was
actionable as a breach of his statutory duty imposed by section 7501,"'
which requires the employer to collect taxes from employees and remit
them to the government."" As a result, the IRS was entitled to collect the
101. Finley, 123 F.3dat 1348.
102. Id. at 1350.











114. 26 U.S.C. § 7501 (1994). The general rule stated in this statute says that:
CORPORATE LAW
tax despite the IRS's assessment of the liability."' Hence, liability at-
tached to the corporate "responsible person" when he or she withheld the
collected taxes regardless of prior assessments."6
C. Other Circuits
During the survey period, the Seventh Circuit recognized the need to
demonstrate that an officer "willfully" failed to remit taxes and deter-
mined that the requirement was satisfied by the showing of a reckless
disregard of a known risk that the taxes might not be paid."" In Mazzeo v.
United States,"8 the Second Circuit interpreted "willfully" to include
those nonpayments of withheld funds to the government that were "vol-
untary, conscious, and intentional, as opposed to accidental."' 9 Thus, the
Second Circuit failed to include "recklessness" in its interpretation of,,willfulness. ' ' "
Similarly to the Seventh Circuit, the Ninth Circuit, in Phillips v.
United States Internal Revenue Service,"' specifically asserted that a
showing of a reckless disregard may be sufficient to meet the "willful"
requirement necessary to hold an officer liable for failing to remit
taxes." Accordingly, the court defined willfulness as a "voluntary, con-
scious and intentional act to prefer other creditors over the United
States.'"" In addition, the court did not require a showing that the corpo-
rate officer acted with a "bad motive" in order to meet the definition of
willfulness.'2
In Bugge v. United States,'" the Fifth Circuit determined that the IRS
could hold each person deemed a "responsible person" accountable for
all of the corporation's delinquency.'" The Second Circuit held that the
definition of a "responsible person" was to include any person "con-
nected closely enough with the business to prevent the [tax] default from
Whenever any person is required to collect or withhold any internal revenue tax from
any other person and to pay over such tax to the United States, the amount of tax so col-
lected or withheld shall be held to be a special fund in trust for the United States. The
amount of such fund shall be assessed, collected, and paid in the same manner and sub-
ject to the same provisions and limitations (including penalties) as are applicable with re-
spect to the taxes from which such funds arose.
26 U.S.C. § 7501.
115. Goldston, 104 F.3d at 1201.
116. Id.
117. United States v. Kim, I 11F.3d 1351, 1357 (7th Cir. 1997).
118. 131 F.3d 295 (2d Cir. 1997).
119. Mazzeo, 131 F.3d at 299 (quoting Kalb v. United States, 505 F.2d 506, 511 (2d
1974)).
120. Id.
121. 73 F.3d 939 (9th Cir, 1996).
122. Phillips, 73 F.3d at 942.
123. Id.
124. Id.
125. 99 F.3d 740 (5th Cir. 1996).
126. Bugge, 99 F.3d at 744.
Cir.
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occurring." '' In Phillips, the Ninth Circuit determined that although the
corporate executive was hospitalized, he was held personally liable be-
cause he either clearly ought to have known that the withheld taxes were
not being paid, or that there was a risk that the money was not paid to the
government, when he had an opportunity to investigate whether they had
been paid."
D. Analysis
Finley" and Goldston"" represent cases in which the Tenth Circuit
pierced the corporate veil pursuant to a statutory rule, as opposed to the
application of the common law doctrine. Following the rule set forth by
section 6672, the Finley court held that a corporate officer could be held
personally liable when he or she willfully fails to investigate or correct
mismanagement after learning of tax withholding delinquencies.' The
Seventh Circuit determined that a reckless disregard of a risk that the
withheld taxed might not be paid was sufficient to meet the statutory
requirement of "willfulness."'' 2 The Second Circuit was more conserva-
tive in its interpretation of "willful," holding that proof of a reckless dis-
regard of a known risk that the withheld taxes may not be remitted was
insufficient to expose the officers to liability.'
33
The Goldston court applied the strict statutory rule thrusting personal
liability upon those who are responsible for collecting taxes and fail to
remit them, regardless of prior assessment liability.3 4 Both the Second
and Ninth Circuits further defined what constitutes a "responsible per-
son."'13 These circuits defined responsibility by examining the extent of
the individual's relationship to his or her business." Responsible persons
could, according to the Fifth Circuit, each be responsible for the entire
amount of the corporation's tax delinquency.
127. Mazzeo v. United States, 131 F.3d 295, 298 (2d Cir. 1997) (quoting Fiataruolo v. United
States, 8 F.3d 930, 939 (2d Cir. 1993) (internal quotation marks omitted)).
128. Phillips, 73 F.3d at 940-44.
129. Finley v. United States, 123 F.3d 1342 (10th Cir. 1997).
130. Goldston v. United States, 104 F.3d 1198 (10th Cir. 1997).
131. Finley, 123 F.3d at 1343.
132. United States v. Kim, 111 F.3d 1351, 1358 (7th Cir. 1997).
133. Mazzeo v. United States, 131 F.3d 295, 299 (2d Cir. 1997).
134. Goldston, 104 F.3d at 1201.
.135. Mazzeo, 131 F.3d at 298; Phillips, 73 F.3d at 941.
136. Mazzeo, 131 F.3d at 298 (stating that responsible individuals include all those who are
connected closely enough with the company to prevent the tax default from occurring); Phillips, 73
F.3d at 941 (concluding that the defendants admission of his "responsible person" status was war-
ranted due to the fact that he owned the company, was in charge of the bank accounts, and decided
which bills would be paid).
137. Bugge v. United States, 99 F.3d 740, 744 (5th Cir. 1996).
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CONCLUSION
In the past year, the Tenth Circuit has further explored the parame-
ters of the principle of corporate limited liability by examining circum-
stances that warrant its disregard. The court failed to pierce the corporate
veil when a parent company was sued for a tort allegedly committed by
its subsidiary. While some circuits differed from the Tenth Circuit's cor-
porate veil-piercing analysis, the Tenth Circuit was consistent with the
prevailing common law interpretation of the doctrine. The Tenth Circuit
has broadly interpreted the "willful" requirement of section 6672, ex-
tending it to situations in which the officer recklessly disregarded a risk
that the tax withholdings would not be remitted to the government.
Michael P. Dulin

